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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
portance to warrant federal control. This determination would be
especially difficult in multi-party states. It seems evident that' even
the minority party primary has some effect on the general election.3 9
The extension of protection to primaries equivalent to election because of
the character of local politics, while 'denying protection to the minority
party primaries, might be arbitrary discrimination in violation of the
due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.40 And
though one party may have dominated a state for many years, and so
brought its primaries under federal protection, a political upheaval
might put the other party in power and its candidates in office, even
though its primaries had not been under federal supervision. These
questions must be resolved by future legislation or judicial decree.
This decision, the court being divided four to three on the question of
statutory construction, stands in danger of being overruled unless more
definite laws are passed. Specific statutes would eliminate the idea of
judicial legislation and greatly lighten the burden which the instant
case places on the judiciary. Therefore it is submitted: (1) An appro-
priate Federal Primary Control Act should be enacted settling the
difficulties inherent in the application of the instant case. (2) Full
protection of the public in elections demands, in the event such legisla-
tion is passed, that the court shall not find it repugnant to the Consti-
tution when applied to minority party primaries not integral parts of the
election by law, but shall take the further necessary step of holding that
federal control may extend to all primaries where a federal office is
involved.
JOHN T. KLPATRICK, JR.
Evidence-The Opinion Rule-Use of Hypothetical
Question as Basis of Expert Opinion
The P's intestate was thrown to the center of the highway when the
auto in which she was riding as a passenger failed to make a turn in
the road and struck a bridge abutment. One of the D motor lines'
trucks was immediately behind the car. P's contention is that the truck
ran over the girl's body, thereby contributing to her death. The D con-
tends that its truck passed to the left of the prone figure. On trial, the
D motor lines offered testimony of a physician who had examined the
girl, and proposed to ask him the following question:
" See concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Pitney in Newberry v. United States,
256 U. S. 232, 275, 41 Sup. Ct. 469, 480, 65 L. ed. 913, 928 (1921)."'Defendants raised this point in their petition for rehearing. (Rehearing
denied Oct. 14, 1941, 10 LAW WEEK 3125) ; Brief in support of petition for rehear-




"Dr. T, from your examination of the body of Mildred Catherine Hester,
before her death, as you have testified, and the examination of the in-
juries such as you have found, do you have an opinion satisfactory to
yourself as to whether or not any of those injuries were caused by the
lody coming into contact with the Horton Motor Company's truck?"
The answer, as reported out of the hearing of the jury, was:
"I do not believe that any of her injuries were sustained by being struck
by the Horton Motor Lines' truck."
The trial judge excluded the question and answer, presumably on
the ground that it was opinion evidence invading the province of the
jury. Thereafter, the jury found for the P and rendered a substantial
verdict against the trucking concern, the driver of the truck, and the
driver of the wrecked car. On appeal by the D motor lines; held' that
the exclusion of the proposed question and answer constituted reversible
error.
2
The instant case raises two problems which will be dealt with in
this note: (1) The extent of the rule against invading the province of
the jury in cause and effect cases--cases where given a particular hurt,
expert opinion evidence is offered as to the contributing causes. (2) The
permissible wording of such a question, opinion evidence being
admissible.
Among the foremost of the exclusionary rules of evidence is the
so-called "opinion" .rule. The substance of it and the original founda-
tion of the rule, to use Wigmore's terminology, is the requirement
of "Testimonial Knowledge". The witness must know from a factual
basis whereof he speaks, and must not be merely hazarding a guess.3
In addition, the rule is held to cover the inferences drawn by witnesses
who have had personal observation.4 A recognized exception exists
where the witness has some special skill or experience which would aid
the tribunal in arriving at its conclusions from the operative facts and
the subject is one that requires special knowledge, skill, experience, or
training.5 However, there has been a tendency to limit the scope of
this exception by, in turn, grafting an exception on it. That is, Amer-
ican courts have shown an inclination to 'exclude even the opinion of
expert witnesses, on the issue or issues which ultimately go to the jury.6
'Hester v. Motor Lines, 219 N. C. 14 S. E. (2d) 794 (1941).
2 Even though, previously, the Doctor was permitted to testify that the girl's
injuries were produced by her striking the concrete roadbed.
'2 WIGMoRE, EvIDENcE (3d. ed. 1923) §§657, 557. RESTATEMENT, CODE oF
EVIDENCE: (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1933) §501.
'WIGmOm, EViDENCE (student's Textbook 1935) §127.
RESTATEMENT, CODE OF EVIDENCE (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1933) §502; 2 WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) 557; State v. Hightower, 187 N. C. 300, 121
S. E. 616 (1926); State v. Bowman, 78 N. C. 509 (1878).
'Keefe v. Amour & Co., 258 Ill. 28, 101 N. E. 252 (1913); Yost v. Conroy,
1941]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The theory followed is that such testimony would usurp the function
of the jury.
While it is difficult to harmonize the decision in this state where the
jury-province rule has been applied, the North Carolina court has con-
sistently paid lip service to it. Our court, however, in a majority of
the cases, has indicated that the rule's objection is avoided (and expert
opinion evidence is admissible) : (1) If the opinion is based upon facts
admitted or found, as contrasted with facts which are controverted ;7
(2) if all the surrounding facts are known to the expert from personal
observation ;8 or (3) if, where the facts are controverted, the opinion is
presented as the answer to a hypothetical question, even though the
question may present the identical problem as the ultimate issue for the
jury.9
In the cases placed by the court in the third category, a considerable
emphasis is directed to the wording of the hypothetical question.10 It
92 Ind. 464 (1883); United States v. Steadman, 73 F. (2d) 704 (C. C. A. 10th,
1934).
See, Summerlin v. Carolina & N. W. R. Co., 133 N. C. 550, 555, 45 S. E.
898, 900 (1903) where the court suggested that even in this instance the question
should be hypothetical because the jury must still pass upon the credibility of
the witness.
' At this point the cases are difficult to follow. The proposition was dearly
sustained in the following cases: George v. Winston-Salem Southbound Ry., 215
N. C. 773, 95 S. E. 2d 373 (1939); Keith v. Gregg, 210 N. C. 802. 188 S. E.
849 (1936) ; Shaw v. National Handle Co., 188 N. C. 222, 124 S. E. 325 (1924) ;
Stpte v. Hightower, 187 N. C. 300, 121 S. E. 616 (1923) (the court did suggest
in this case that the better practice would have been to question the expert in hypo-
thetical form) ; Ferebee v. Norfolk & So. Ry., 167 N. C. 290, 83 S. E. 360
(1914). But the distinction between cases where the court has required the use
of the hypothetical question and the cases above cited is slight. In each of the
cases cited in footnote 10 infra--cases where the hypothetical question was re-
quired-it is submitted that the expert based his opinion as much upon per-
sonally observed facts as the experts testifying in the cases listed here-cate-
gory (2). What seems to bother thd court in these latter cases is not so much
whether the opinion was based upon observed facts, but whether the witness's
opportunity of observation sufficiently put him in command of the circumstances
that he should be permitted to give a definite opinion as to the producing cause
of the injury. This is to say that, if the expert did not examine the injured party
until a considerable time after the accident, such as was true in the Sumnierlin
case, 133 N. C. 550, 4S S. E. 898, there is a strong possibility thall other factors
could have produced or aggravated the injury. Apparently, the court wishes
this possibility of error brought -to the attention of the jury at the time the jury
receives the opinion.
- State v. Carr, 196 N. C. 129, 144 S. E. 698 (1928); Hill v. Louisville Ry.,
186 N. C. 475, 119 S. E. 884 (1923); Plummer v. Seaboard Airline, 176 N. C.
279, 96 S. E. 1032 (1918) ; Lynch v. Rosemary Mfg. Co., 167 N. C. 98, 82 S. E.
6 (1914) ; Herring v. Atl. Coastline Ry. Co., 160 N. C. 252, 74 S. E. 8 (1912) ;
Parrish v. High Point Ry. Co., 146 N. C. 125, 59 S. E. 348 (1907); State v.
Wilco3, 132 N. C. 1120, 44 S. E. 625 (1903) ; Summerlin v. Carolina & N. W. R.
Co., 133 N. C. 550, 45 S. E. 898 (1903); State v. Cole, 94 N. C. 959 (1886);
State v. Bowman, 78 N. C. 509 (1878).
" See particularly: Summerlin v. Carolina & N. W. R. Co., 133 N. C. 550,
45 S. E. 898 (1903); Parrish v. High Point Ry. Co., 146 N. C. 125, 59 S. E.
348 (1907) ; Herring v. Atl. Coastline Ry. Co., 160 N. C. 252, 74 S. E. 8 (1912);
State v. Bowman, 78 N. C. 509 (1878).
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is said that the question should contain a statement of facts which
might have been testified to by witnesses or which may be found by the
jury from the evidence." "The party propounding the question may,
it is true, so array the facts in the question as to present fully his con-
tention in regard to them, provided there be evidence legally sufficient
to sustain a finding of them by the jury., The proper form of the ques-
tion is: If certain facts assumed in the question to be established by
the evidence should be found by the jury, what would be the witness's
opinion upon the facts thus found of the matter involved and to which
the inquiry is directed ?''12 Some cases have stressed the point that the
question should conclude with a clause: "might these factors have pro-
duced this result",' 3 or "could the injury have been caused by these
factors".14  However, this requirement has not been consistently ap-
plied. In later cases, generally, the wording of the hypothetical ques-
tion was examined less technically then in the earlier cases. 5
Judged by these standards, the action of the trial judge in the prin-
cipal case in excluding the question submitted was entirely correct, as
the record shows the question did not follow the prescribed lines, and
the issue of the truck striking P's intestate was a fundamental issue in
the case against the motor lines. However, it is submitted that the
position taken by the appellate court is the more sensible one.
The theory behind the use of the hypothetical question is sound. A
means is provided by which the trier of fact may determine the value
of the opinion by comparing and evaluating the facts in its premises
with the facts as ultimately found from all the evidence.' 6 Yet, sound
as it may seem theoretically, many abuses have been- committed in its
name. There is always a tendency on the part of the courts (this is
true in this state) 1 7 to adopt one form of wording as a formula-a
breach of which constitutes reversible error. In addition, clever law-
yers often conceal the real significance of the evidence by unduly empha-
sizing certain data. Often they are able to distort the expert's opinion
in such a manner that his answer to a complicated question may not
express his actual opinion to the actual facts.' 8 Because of these abuses,
"I See note 12 infra.
12 Summerlin v. Carolina & N. W. R. Co., 133 N. C. 550, 45 S. E. 898 (1903).
Parrish v. High Point Ry. Co., 146 N. C. 125, 58 S. E. 348 (1907).
Herring v. Atl. Coastline Ry. Co., 160 N. C. 252, 74 S. E. 8 (1912). It is
submitted that this requirement springs from the same proposition as was dis-
cussed in footnote 9 supra.
2r The court has been more ready to say that an expert is basing his opinion
upon sufficient personal observation. George v. Winston-Salem Southbound Ry.
Co., 215 N. C. 773, 95 S. E. (2d) 373 (1939); Keith v. Gregg, 210 N. C. 802,
188 S. E. 849 (1936).
1"Rosenthal, Tire Development of the Use of Expert Testinony (1935) 2
LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 403.
17 See cases cited in footnote 9 supra.
28 See 2 WIGmoRE, EviDENcE (3rd ed. 1940) §686.
1941]
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most authorities advocate that the expert witness be permitted to give
his opinion without the use of a hypothetical question.1 9 It is their con-
tention that cross-examination could be successfully employed to bring
out the exact facts upon which the opinion is based, and that therefore
there is no need for posing a time-consuming hypothetical question as
a preliminary to the opinion.
As for the rule excluding evidence which the court deems as usurp-
ing the province of the jury, it seems unreasonable that the admissibility
of expert opinion should be dependent on any such meritless and nebu-
lous standard. As pointed out in a previous case comment in this
REVIEW :20 "Evidence of the very point in issue would seem to be of the
highest pertinency. Thus a strict application of the rule leads to the
absurd result that admissibility varies in inverse proportion to rel-
evancy". This policy is often defended in that it is said to be necessary
to prevent the jury from giving unmerited weight to such an opinion
instead of giving the question that independent consideration to which
a party is entitled in a jury trial. However, this argument is difficult
to follow for, by hypothesis, the subject is one with which the jury is in-
capable of dealing. It is submitted that a more productive approach
would be simply to ask whether, under the circumstances of the case,
the opinion would aid the jury in arriving at a sound decision.
E. W. COLE, JR.
Labor Law-Applicability of Anti-Racketeering Act to
Certain Practices of Labor Unions
Convicted under the Federal Anti-Racketeering Act,1 defendant, a
truck drivers' union in New York City, appealed to the federal circuit
court. Evidence was that the union sought to control all hauling in
New York City; that it posted members on the edge of the city, who
attempted to commandeer incoming trucks, drive them within the city,
and do any necessary loading and unloading; that various breaches of
the peace and acts of violence resulted when the truck operators re-
sisted the labor unions; that in most cases the union men exacted up
to $9.42 (a day's wages) from each incoming truck, regardless of the
length of time involved in driving or "standing by" ;2 and that the union
192 WIGmoRE, EvIDENcE (3d ed. 1940) §686; RESTATEMENT, 'CODE OF Evi-
DENcE (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1933) §509; Tentative Draft of Model Expert Testi-
mo ny Act, 11.
"0 Note (1938) 16 N. C. L. REv. 180.
'48 Stat. 979 (1934), 18 U. S. C. A. §420a-e (Supp., 1940).
'As the name implies, a stand-by is a local union member who is present at
a particular job-site and is paid a full salary, because of pressure exerted on
the employer by a labor union, but who does practically no work, due to the
[Vol. 20
